Abstract. Metamorphic malware apply semantics-preserving transformations to their own code in order to foil detection systems based on signature matching. In this paper we consider the problem of automatically extract metamorphic signatures from these malware. We introduce a semantics for self-modifying code, later called phase semantics, and prove its correctness by showing that it is an abstract interpretation of the standard trace semantics. Phase semantics precisely models the metamorphic code behavior by providing a set of traces of programs which correspond to the possible evolutions of the metamorphic code during execution. We show that metamorphic signatures can be automatically extracted by abstract interpretation of the phase semantics, and that regular metamorphism can be modelled as finite state automata abstraction of the phase semantics.
Introduction
Challenges and insights. Detecting and neutralizing computer malware, such as worms, viruses, trojans, and spyware is a major challenge in modern computer security, involving both sophisticated intrusion detection strategies and advanced code manipulation tools and methods. Traditional misuse malware detectors (also known as signaturebased detectors) are typically syntactic in nature: they use pattern matching to compare the byte sequence comprising the body of the malware against a signature database [22] . Malware writers have responded by using a variety of techniques in order to avoid detection: Encryption, oligomorphism with mutational decryptor patterns, and polymorphism with different encryption methods for generating an endless sequence of decryption patterns are typical strategies for achieving malware diversification. Metamorphism emerged in the last decade as an effective alternative strategy to foil detectors. Metamorphic malware apply semantics-preserving transformations to modify its own code so that one instance of the malware bears very little resemblance to another instance, in a kind of body-polymorphism [23] , even though semantically, their functionality is the same. Thus, a metamorphic malware is a malware equipped with a metamorphic engine that takes the malware, or parts of it, as input and morphs it to a syntactically different but semantically equivalent variant in order to avoid detection. The quantity of metamorphic variants possible for a particular piece of malware makes it impractical to maintain a signature set that is large enough to cover most or all of these variants, making standard signature-based detection ineffective [6] . Existing malware detectors therefore fall back on a variety of heuristic techniques, but these may be prone to false positives (where innocuous files are mistakenly identified as malware) or false negatives (where malware escape detection) at worst. The reason for this vulnerability to metamorphism lies upon the purely syntactic nature of most exiting and commercial detectors. The key for identifying metamorphic malware lies, instead, in a deeper understanding of their semantics. Still a major drawback of existing semantics-based methods (e.g., see [13, 19] ) relies upon the a priori knowledge of the obfuscations used to implement the metamorphic engine. Because of this, it is always possible for any expert malware writer to develop alternative metamorphic strategies, even by simple modification of existing ones, able to foil any given detection scheme.
Contributions.
We proposes a different approach to metamorphic malware detection based on the idea that extracting metamorphic signatures is approximating malware semantics. A metamorphic signature is therefore any (possibly decidable) approximation of the properties of code evolution. The semantics concerns here the way code changes, i.e., the effect of instructions that modify other instructions. We face the problem of determining how code mutates, yet catching properties of this mutation, without any a priori knowledge about the implementation of the metamorphic transformations. Traditional static analysis techniques are not adequate for this purpose, as they typically assume that programs do not change during execution. We therefore define a more general semantics-based behavioral model, called phase semantics, that can cope with changes to the program code at run time. The idea is to partition each possible execution trace of a metamorphic program into phases, each collecting the computations performed by a particular code variant. The sequence of phases (once disassembled) represents the sequence of possible code mutations, while the sequence of states within a given phase represents the behavior of a particular code variant. Abstract interpretation is then used to extract the invariant properties of phases, which are properties of the generated program variants. Abstract domains represent here properties of the code shape in phases. We use the domain of finite state automata (FSA) for approximating phases and provide a static semantics of traces of FSA as a computable abstraction of the phase semantics. We introduce the notion of regular metamorphism as a further approximation obtained by abstracting sequences of FSA into a single FSA. This abstraction provides an upper regular language-based approximation of any metamorphic behavior of a program. This is particularly suitable to extract metamorphic signatures for engines implemented themselves as FSA of basic code transformations, which correspond to the way most classical metamorphic generators are implemented [16, 20, 25] . Our approach is general and language independent, providing a systematic method for extracting approximate metamorphic signatures from any metamorphic malware P , in such a way that checking whether a given binary matches the metamorphic signature of P is decidable.
Background
Mathematical notation. Given two sets S and T , we denote with ℘(S) the powerset of S, with S T the set-difference between S and T , with S ⊂ T strict inclusion and with S ⊆ T inclusion. Let S ⊥ be set S augmented with the undefined value ⊥, i.e., S ⊥ = S ∪ {⊥}. P, ≤ denotes a poset P with ordering relation ≤, while a complete lattice P , with ordering ≤, least upper bound (lub) ∨, greatest lower bound (glb) ∧, greatest element (top) , and least element (bottom) ⊥ is denoted by P, ≤, ∨, ∧, , ⊥ .
denotes pointwise ordering between functions. If f : S → T and g : T → Q then g • f : S → Q denotes the composition of f and g, i.e., g • f = λx.g(f (x)). f : P → Q on posets is (Scott)-continuous when f preserves lub of countable chains in P . f : C → D on complete lattices is additive (co-additive) when for any 
The language L (M ) accepted by an FSA M is the set of all strings accepted by M . Given an FSA M and a partition π over its states, the quotient automaton M/π = (Q , δ , S , F , A) is defined as follows:
can be equivalently specified as a graph M = (Q, E, S, F ) with a node q ∈ Q for each automata state and a labeled edge (q, s, q ) ∈ E if and only if q ∈ δ(q, s).
Abstract Interpretation. Abstract interpretation is based on the idea that the behaviour of a program at different levels of abstraction is an approximation of its (concrete) semantics [8, 9] . The concrete program semantics is computed on the concrete domain C, ≤ C , while approximation is encoded by an abstract domain A, ≤ A . In abstract interpretation abstraction is specified as a Galois connection (GC) (C, α, γ, A) , i.e., an adjunction [8, 9] , namely as an abstraction map α : C → A and a concretization map γ :
and A 2 be abstract domains of the concrete domain C: A 1 is more precise than A 2 when γ 2 (A 2 ) ⊆ γ 1 (A 1 ). Given a GC (C, α, γ, A) and a concrete predicate transformer (semantics) F : C → C, we say that
, not all abstract domains induce a complete abstraction [17] . The least fixpoint (lfp) of an operator F on a poset P, ≤ , when it exists, is denoted by lfp ≤ F , or by lfpF when ≤ is clear. Any continuous operator F :
, where for any i ∈ N and x ∈ C:
Expressions: 
Convergence can be ensured through widening iterations along increasing chains [8] . A widening operator : P × P → P approximates the lub, i.e., ∀X, Y ∈ P : 
Modelling metamorphism
Abstract assembly language. Executable programs make no fundamental distinction between code and data. This makes it possible to modify a program by operating on a memory location as though it contains data, e.g., by adding or subtracting some value from it, and then interpreting the result as code and executing it. To model this aspect, we define a program to be a pair P = (m, a), where m specifies the contents of a memory (both code and data) and a denotes the entry point of P , namely the address of the first instruction of P . Since a memory location contains a natural number that can be interpreted either as data or as instruction 3 we use an injective function encode : I → N that, given an instruction I ∈ I, returns its binary encode(I) ∈ N, and a function decode : N → I ⊥ that given a natural number n returns I if encode(I) = n otherwise ⊥. Fig. 1 shows the syntax of our abstract assembly language, whose structure is inspired from real assembly languages. A program state is a tuple a, m, θ, I where m is the memory map, a is the address of the next instruction to be executed, θ ∈ N * is the stack and I ∈ N * is the input string. Let Σ = N ⊥ × M × N * × N * be the set of program states. The semantics of expressions is specified by a function E : 
be the transition relation between states, which is given by the point-wise extension of T ( a, m, θ, I ) = I [[decode(m(a) )]] a, m, θ, I . As usual [11] , the maximal finite trace semantics
Phase Semantics. Intuitively, a phase is a maximal sequence of states in an execution trace that does not overwrite any memory location storing an instruction that is going to be executed later in the same trace. Given an execution trace σ = σ 0 . . . σ n , we can identify phase boundaries by considering the sets of memory locations modified by each state
every time that a location a j , with i < j ≤ n, of a future instruction is modified by the execution of state σ i , then the successive state σ i+1 is a phase boundary, since it stores a modified version of the code. We consider the set mod (σ i ) ⊆ N of memory locations that are modified by the instruction executed in state σ i :
This allows us to formally define the phase boundaries and the phases of a trace.
Definition 1 The set of phase boundaries of
The set of phases of a trace σ ∈ Σ * is:
Observe that, by definition, the memory map of the first state of a phase always specifies the code snapshot that is executed in the same phase. Hence, the sequence of the initial states of the phases of a trace highlights the different code snapshots encountered during code execution. In general, different executions of a program give rise to different sequences of code snapshots. A complete characterization of all code snapshots of a self-modifying program can be obtained by organizing phases in a program evolution graph. Here, each vertex is a code snapshot P i corresponding to a phase, and an edge P i → P j indicates that in some execution trace of the program, a phase with code snapshot P i can be followed by a phase with code snapshot P j .
Definition 2 The program evolution graph of a program
is therefore a sequence of programs P 0 . . . P n such that for every i ∈ [0, n[ we have that (P i , P i+1 ) ∈ E. Given a program P 0 the set of all possible (finite) paths of the program evolution graph G[ Consider for instance the metamorphic program P 0 of Fig. 2 . The metamorphic engine of P 0 , which is stored at memory locations from 8 to 13, writes a nop at memory location 4 and copies the original content of this location to the free location identified by MEM[f ]; then it adds some goto instructions to preserve the original semantics. We consider the execution trace σ = σ 0 σ 1 . . . σ 17 of program P 0 corresponding to the input sequence I = 7 :: 6, in particular σ = 1, m 0 , , 7 :: 6 2, Fixpoint phase semantics. We introduce the notion of mutating transition, i.e., a transition between two states that leads to a state which is a phase boundary. We say that a pair of states
. This allows us to define the code transformer T Ph : ℘(P) → ℘(P) that associates with each set of programs the set of their possible metamorphic variants: P j ∈ T Ph (P i ) means that during execution program P i can be transformed into program P j .
Definition 3 T
Ph : ℘(P) → ℘(P) is given by the point-wise extension of:
Correctness and completeness of phase semantics. We prove the correctness of phase semantics by showing that it is a sound approximation of trace semantics, namely by providing a pair of adjoint maps α Ph :
Abstraction α Ph observes only the states of a trace that are phase boundaries and it can be lifted point-wise to ℘(Σ * ) giving rise to the GC (℘(Σ * ), α Ph , γ Ph , ℘(P * )). The following result shows the correctness of the phase semantics.
Theorem 2 ∀X ∈ ℘(Σ
The converse may not hold: 
Abstracting metamorphism
Our model of metamorphic code behaviour is based on a very low-level representation of programs as memory maps that simply give the contents of memory locations together with the address of the instruction to be executed next. While such a representation is necessary to precisely capture the effects of code self-modification, it is not a convenient representation if we want to statically analyze the different code snapshots encountered during a program's execution. Our idea is to design an abstract interpretation of phase semantics, namely to approximate the computation of phase semantics on an abstract domain that captures properties of the evolution of the code, rather than of the evolution of program states, as usual in abstract interpretation. We have to: 
is an abstract metamorphic signature for P 0 . Abstract domains for code properties need to approximate properties of sequences of instructions. This can be achieved naturally by grammar-based, constraint-based and finite state automata abstractions. In the following we propose to abstract programs by a FSA describing the sequence of (possibly abstract) instructions that may be disassembled from the given memory.
Phases as FSA. The most commonly used program representation is the control flow graph. In this representation, the vertices contain the instructions to be executed, and the edges represent possible control flow. For our purposes, it is convenient to consider a dual representation where vertices correspond to program locations and abstract instructions label edges. Let M P denote the FSA-representation of a given program P and let L (M P ) be the language it recognizes. The idea is that for each sequence in L (M P ) the order of the instructions in the sequence corresponds to the execution order of the corresponding concrete instructions in at least one run of the control flow graph of P . Instructions are abstracted in order to provide a simplified alphabet. In the rest of the paper, for the sake of simplicity, we consider function ι : I →I defined in Fig. 3 . Let ρ : I × N → ℘(N) denote any sound control flow analysis that determines the possible successors of a given instruction at a given location, namely ρ(I, b) associates with instruction I stored at memory location b the set of locations of its possible successors. Let F be the set of FSA over the alphabetI of abstract instructions where every state is considered to be final. Each FSA in F is specified as a graph M = (Q, E, S). We define functionα : P → F that associates with each program P = (m, a) its corresponding FSA-representation as follows:α(P ) = (Q P , E P , {a}) where Q P = {b | decode(m(b)) ∈ I} is the set of locations that store an instruction of P , and the set of edges E P ⊆ Q P ×I × Q P is computed by the algorithm Edges in Fig. 3 . This algorithm, given P = (m, a), starts by initializing E P to the empty set and then for every memory location b that stores an instruction I it adds an edge labeled with ι(I), whose source is the location b and whose destinations are the locations in ρ (I, b) . As an example, at the top of Fig. 3 we show the automatonα(P 0 ) corresponding to program P 0 of Fig. 2 . We say that π = a
Observe that even if the alphabetI is unbounded (due to the unlimited number of possible expressions), the FSA-representation of every program uses only a finite subset of alphabetI. By point-wise extension of functionα we obtain the GC (℘(P),α,γ, ℘(F)). Note that abstraction ι defined above makes the FSA-representation of programs independent (up to renaming) from program position.
Theorem 4 If P 1 and P 2 differ only in their memory position thenα(P 1 ) andα(P 2 ) are equivalent up to address renaming.
Abstract phase semantics as traces of FSA. Let α F : P * → F * be the extension of α : P → F to sequences: α F ( ) = and α F (P 0 P 1 . . . P n ) =α(P 0 )α F (P 1 . . . P n ). α F can be lifted point-wise to ℘(P * ) and it gives rise to the GC (℘(P * ), α F , γ F , ℘(F * )). In order to compute a correct approximation of the phase semantics on ℘(F * ), ⊆ , we need to define an abstract transition relation T F : ℘(F) → ℘(F) on FSA that correctly approximates T Ph : ℘(P) → ℘(P). One possibility is to define T F as the best correct approximation of 
] may play the role of abstract metamorphic signature of P 0 . To this end, we introduce the notion of limits of a path that approximates the notion of bounds of a trace, and the notion of transition edge that approximates the notion of mutating transition. Moreover, we assume to have access to the following sound program analyses for P 0 : -a stack analysis StackVal : N → ℘(N) that approximates the set of possible values on the top of the stack when control reaches a given location (e.g. [1, 2] ); -a memory analysis LocVal : N × N → ℘(N) that approximates the set of possible values that can be stored in a memory location when the control reaches a given location (e.g. [1, 2] ). These analyses allow us to define EVal : N × E → ℘(N), that approximates the evaluation of an expression in a given point:
in all other cases Moreover, we define write :I × N → ℘(N) approximating the set of locations that may be modified by the execution of an abstract instruction memorized at a given location:
We define the limits of a path π as the nodes that are reached by an edge labeled by an abstract instruction that may modify the label of a future edge in π, namely an abstract instruction that occurs later in the same path. Given a path π = a 0 [I 0 ] . . . [I n−1 ]a n we have:
Definition 4 A pair of program locations (b, c) is a transition edge of M = (Q, E, S),
In the FSA of Fig. 3 the transition edges are the dashed ones since the instructions labeling these edges overwrite a location that is reachable in the future. Observe that also the instructions labeling the edges from 8 to 9, from 9 to 10, and from 10 to 11 write instructions in memory, but the locations that store these instructions are not reachable when considering the control flow of P 0 . In order to statically compute the set of possible FSA evolution of a given automaton M = (Q, E, S) we need to statically execute the abstract instructions that may modify an FSA. Algorithm EXE(M,I, b) in Fig. 4 returns the set Exe of all possible FSA that can be obtained by executing instructionI stored at location b of automaton M . The algorithm starts by initializing Exe to the FSA M that has the same states and edges of M and whose possible initial states S are the nodes reachable through instructionI stored at b in M . This ensures correctness when the execution of instructionI does not correspond to a real code mutation. Then ifI writes in memory we consider the set X of locations that it can modify and the set Y of possible instructions that it can write, and we add to Exe the set of all possible automata that can be obtained by writing an instruction of Y in a memory location in X, i.e., NEXT(X, Y, M, b). 
EXE(M,I, b) // M = (Q, E, S) is a FSA
Exe = {M = (Q, E, S ) | S = {d | (b,I, d) ∈ E}} ifI = MEM[e1] := e2 then X = write(I, b) Y = {n | n ∈ EVal (b, e2), decode(n) ∈ I} Exe = Exe ∪ NEXT(X, Y, M, b) ifI = input ⇒ MEM[e] then X = write(I, b) Y = {n | n is an input , decode(n) ∈ I} Exe = Exe ∪ NEXT(X, Y, M, b) ifI = pop e then X = write(I, b) Y = {n | n ∈ StackVal (b), decode(n) ∈ I} Exe = Exe ∪ NEXT(X, Y, M, b) return Exe NEXT(X, Y, M, b) Next = ∅ while X = ∅ select aj from X and X = X {aj } E = E {(aj,Ij, c) | (aj,Ij, c) ∈ E} Next = Next ∪ S n∈Y {M = (Q,Ê,Ŝ) | Q = Q ∪ {aj} ∪ ρ(decode(n), aj) E =Ê ∪ {(aj , ι(decode(n)), d) | d ∈ ρ(decode(n), aj)} S = {d | (b,I, d) ∈ E} } return NextSucc(M ) = M a 0 [I 0 ] . . . [I l−1 ]a l [I l ]a l+1 ∈ Π(M ), (a l , a l+1 ) ∈ TE(M ), ∀i ∈ [0, l[: (a i , a i+1 ) ∈ TE(M ), M ∈ EXE(M,I l , a l )
We can now define the static transition T : ℘(F) → ℘(F). The idea is that

Definition 5 Let M = (Q, E, S). T : ℘(F) → ℘(F) is given by the point-wise extension of:
that statically approximates the iterative computation of phase semantics on the abstract domain ℘(F * ), ⊆ as follows:
In Fig. 5 we report a possible sequence of FSA that can be generated during the execution of program P 0 of Fig. 2 . In this case, thanks to the simplicity of the example, it is possible to use the transition relation over FSA defined by T F . Fig. 2 , where the metamorphic engine, namely the instructions stored at locations from 8 to 14, is briefly represented by the box marked ME. In the graphic representation of automata we omit to show the nodes that are not reachable.
Widening phases for regular metamorphism
Regular metamorphism models the metamorphic behaviour as a regular language of abstract instructions. This can be achieved by approximating sequences of FSA into a single FSA, denoted W[
] represents all possible (regular) program evolutions of P 0 , i.e., it recognizes all the sequences of instructions that correspond to a run of at least one metamorphic variant of P 0 . This abstraction is able to precisely model metamorphic engines implemented as FSA of basic code replacement as well as it may provide a regular language-based approximation for any metamorphic engine, by extracting the regular invariant of their behaviour. It is known that FSA can be ordered according to the language they recognize:
Observe that F is reflexive and transitive but not antisymmetric and it is therefore a pre-order. Moreover, according to this ordering, an unique least upper bound of two automata M 1 and M 2 does not always exist, since there is an infinite number of automata that recognize the language
, we approximate their least upper bound as follows: s) . FSA are -closed for finite sets, and the following result shows that approximates any upper bound with respect to the ordering F .
Lemma 1 Given two FSA
We can now define
Observe that the set of possible successors of a given automaton M , i.e., T (M ), is finite since we have a (finite family of) successor for every transition edge of M and M has a finite set of edges. Since FSA are -closed for finite sets, then
The following result shows that, when considering finite sets of sequences of FSA,
Theorem 7 For any
The domain F, F has infinite ascending chains, which means that, in general, the fixpoint computation of 
By changing the widening seed we obtain different widening operators. It has been proved that convergence is guaranteed when the widening seed is the relation R n ⊆ Q 1 × Q 2 such that (q 1 , q 2 ) ∈ R n if q 1 and q 2 recognize the same language of strings of length at most n [14] . When considering the widening seed R n we have that two states q and q of M 2 are ≡ Rn -equivalent if they recognize the same language of length at most n that is recognized by a state r of M 1 , i.e., if ∃r ∈ Q 1 : (r, q) ∈ R n and (r, q ) ∈ R n . n denotes the widening operator that uses R n as widening seed. n is well defined if I is finite. This can be achieved by considering expressions as terms and by applying some of the standard methods for approximating them. The most straightforward one is the depth-k string abstraction [24] , while more refined expression abstractions can be designed by considering graph-based or grammar-based term abstractions [3, 15] . For simplicity we consider here the depth-k term abstraction where expressions are represented as trees with leafs that are natural numbers denoting either a memory location or a constant, and internal nodes are the operators constructing expressions, namely the unary operator MEM or the binary operators op. We annotate each node with its depth, namely with the length of the path from the root to the node. The depth-k abstraction, given a tree representation of an expression, considers only the nodes with depth less or equal to k and "cuts" the remaining nodes by approximating them with . For example, the depth-3 abstraction of expression
Given k ∈ N, let ι k :I →I k be the instruction abstraction that applies the depth-k abstraction to the expressions occurring in an abstract instruction, and let α k : F → F k be the function that abstracts the edge labels of a FSA in F according to ι k . It is possible to show that (F, 
contains all the possible sequences of abstract instructions that can be executed by a metamorphic variant of P 0 . As a consequence, a program Q is a regular (abstract) metamorphic variant of P 0 if W[[P 0 ]] recognizes all the sequences of abstract instructions that correspond to the runs of Q up to address renaming: . . . which is not a run of any of the variants of P 0 . Regular metamorphism can easily cope with metamorphic transformations commonly used by malware (e.g., Win95/Regswap, Win32/Ghost, Win95/Zperm, Win95/Zmorph, Win32/Evol) such as: register swap that changes the registers used by the program; code permutation that changes the order in which instructions appear in memory while preserving their execution order through the insertion of direct jumps; junk/nop insertion that inserts junk instructions and semantic-nops, namely instructions that are not executed or that do not alter program functionality. Observe that all these transformations can be seen as special cases of code substitution. Let P 0 be a metamorphic malware: whenever a sequence s 1 of instructions is substituted with an equivalent one s 2 , we have that during the widened fixpoint computation a new path containing sequence s 2 is added to the widened fixpoint W[[P 0 ]]. Therefore, by correctness, W[[P 0 ]] recognizes all the possible metamorphic variants of P 0 obtained through code substitution. Of course it is possible to further abstract W[[P 0 ]] in order to address semantic-nop/junk insertion, permutation and register swap in a more efficient way, namely in such a way that the resulting widened fixpoint is an automaton of a reduced size. In semantic-nop insertion, the more precise is the static analysis used for identifying (sequences of) instructions that are equivalent to nop, the smaller is the widened fixpoint W[[P 0 ]] that we obtain. In code permutation, a smaller FSA can be obtained by performing goto-reduction, i.e., by folding nodes reachable by goto-instructions. In register swapping it is sufficient to replace registers names (i.e., memory locations) with uninterpreted symbols and then use unification to bind these uninterpreted symbols to the actual register names (i.e., memory locations) as done in [5] . Let us consider program P + 0 obtained by enriching the metamorphic engine of program P 0 of Fig. 2 Fig. 6 (b) shows the FSA that represents an approximation of all the possible evolutions of program P + 0 when k ≥ 3. This FSA is obtained through widening with widening seed R 2 and by applying the goto-reduction to handle permutation. We can observe that every time that in the automaton in Fig. 6  (b) we have an edge labeled with MEM[e 1 ] := e 2 between two states q and p, then we also have a path labeled with push e 2 , pop e 1 that connects q and p, and this precisely captures the fact that the metamorphic engine implements this substitution. The goto-reduction allows here to have a reduced FSA, and the self-loop labeled with nop makes clear that the metamorphism could insert an unbounded number of nop instructions. 
Related Works and Discussion
In [13] the authors use trace semantics to characterize the behaviours of both the malware and the potentially infected program, and use abstract interpretation to "hide" their irrelevant behaviours. A program is infected by a malware if their behaviours are indistinguishable up to a certain abstraction, which corresponds to some obfuscations. A significant limitation of this work is that the knowledge of the obfuscation is essential in order to derive abstractions. In [19] the authors model the malware M as a formula in the new logic CTPL, which is an extension of CTL able to handle register renaming. A program P is infected by M , if P satisfies the CTPL formula that models M . By knowing the obfuscations used by malware M it is possible to design CTPL specifications that recognise several metamorphic variants of M . In [7] the idea is to model the malware as a template that expresses the malicious intent. Also in this case the definition of the template is driven by the knowledge of the obfuscations commonly used by malware. Some researchers have tried to detect metamorphic malware by modelling the metamorphic engine as formal grammars and automata [16, 20, 25] . These works are promising, but the design of the grammar and automata is based on the knowledge of the metamorphic transformations used, and none of them provides a methodology for extracting a grammar or an automata from a given metamorphic malware. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any work modelling metamorphism without any a priori knowledge of the transformations used by the metamorphic engine. The only other work we are aware of that formally addresses the analysis of self-modifying code is the one of Cai et al. [4] . However, their goals and results are very different from ours: Cai et al. propose a general framework based on Hoare logic to verify self-modifying code, while we use program semantics and abstract interpretation to extract metamorphic signature from malicious self-modifying code. In this sense, our key contribution relies upon the idea that abstract interpretation of phase semantics may provide useful information about the way code changes, i.e., about the metamorphic engine itself. Interestingly, the language recognized by W[[P ]] provides an upper-approximation of the possible metamorphic variants of the original malware, while the automaton itself models the mechanism of generation of such variants, i.e., the metamorphic engine. With our approach it is therefore possible to extract properties of the implementation of the metamorphic engine by abstract interpretation of the phase semantics. It is clear that the depth-k abstraction considered here for approximating the language of instructions towards a finite alphabet for widening traces of FSA is for sake of simplicity. In general, widening phases for taming the sequence of modified programs (FSA) generated by metamorphism into a single FSA modeling regular metamorphism may require a notion of higher-order widening on FSA, acting both at the level of the graph-structure of the FSA, for approximating the language of instructions, and at the level of the instruction set, for approximating the way a single instruction may be composed. The abstraction of code layout may induce the abstraction of instructions, which itself can be solved by means of FSA. This opens an interesting new field that may represent a future challenge for abstract interpretation: the abstraction of code layout, where the code is the object of abstraction and the way it is generated is the object of abstract interpretation. Of course FSA provide just regular language-based abstractions of the metamorphic engine. More sophisticated approximations, using for instance a la Cousot's context free grammars and set-constraint-based abstractions of sequences of binary instructions [10] , may provide alternative and effective solutions for non-regular metamorphism.
